PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM RESPONDING TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SPECIAL FINDINGS

ABORTION INDUSTRY IN MELBOURNE, FLORIDA
LAWSUITS
RANEY V AWARE WOMAN
DOCKET / CHRONOLOGICAL FILE
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM RESPONDING TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SPECIAL FINDINGS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CASE NO.: 97-1197-CIV-ORL-19B

MEREDITH T. RANEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AWARE WOMAN CENTER FOR CHOICE, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
EDWARD W. WINDLE, JR., and
PATRICIA B. WINDLE,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM RESPONDING TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SPECIAL FINDINGS

Meredith T. Raney, Jr., the Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby responds to the motion for special findings which was served on August 18, 1999 by the Defendants, saying:

ALREADY DENIED

1. The Defendants' first such motion served on April 14, 1999, AWCC MOTION & MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL FINDINGS OF UNREASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS, was denied by this District Court on April 15, 1999. (Document no. 143 with Endorsed Order) Even though the motion of April 14, 1999 and the motion of August 18, 1999 are the same, there is no reference made by the Defendants to the previous denial. The Defendants act like the prior denial of this motion does not exist. Also, Defendants never requested a reconsideration of said denial. It appears that Defendants are pretending that their earlier motion does not exist. They say nothing about the prior denial of this motion. It is very difficult to view this current situation as a mistake, as opposed to a fraud on the Court, in light of claims by Defendants' counsel to a lofty status of expertise as a federal litigator.

NO LOCAL RULE 3.01 (g) COMPLIANCE

2. Defendants have previously filed a motion with an identical title: AWCC MOTION & MEMORANDUM FOR SPECIAL FINDINGS ON UNREASONABLENESS OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. That motion was served by the Defendants on April 14, 1999. There was a compliance with Local Rule 3.01(g) at that time. Even though the title of the August 18, 1999 motion is exactly the same as the April 14, 1999, there is still an obligation of Defendants to comply with Local Rule 3.01(g):

Before filing any motion in a civil case . . .the moving party shall confer with counsel for the opposing party in a good faith effort to resolve the issues raised by the motion . . .

There are several exceptions to this requirement which are specified in the Local Rule but which are omitted from the foregoing quotation because they do not apply. It is clear that counsel for the Defendants had an obligation precedent to filing this motion which he chose to ignore; his reason for so doing may be deduced from the preceding paragraph.

NO RULE 52 AUTHORITY

3. Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, concerns actions tried by the Court without a jury or with an advisory jury. Since this case was never tried, it is apparent that Rule 52 does not apply. Furthermore, this point is underscored by the final sentence of Rule 52(a):

Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule. (Our Note: 56 (c) refers to judgment on partial findings.)

Thus, the rule itself shows that it does not grant the authority for findings of fact in the present case as is claimed by the Defendants.

4. Such was the holding in the case of Thomas v. Peyser, 118 F2d 369 (U.S.C.A. for D of C, 1941) where the Court of Appeals stated:

This case was not tried upon the facts. The facts were admitted by the motion to dismiss. Obviously there need be no findings where facts are not in issue. The only issues determined by the trial court were questions of law and these adequately disposed of the case. page 374.

Thus, case law also shows that there is no authority under the rule cited by Defendants for the relief sought. Their motion of April 14, 1999 was denied and since then, there is certainly no new authority under Rule 52 for the relief sought by their August 18, 1999 replay of the earlier motion.

PROHIBITION BY LOCAL RULE 3.01(b)

5. There has been no obvious request by the Court that Defendants file or serve any other briefs or other legal memoranda subsequent to the summary judgment, such as would create an exception to Local Rule 3.01(b). Absent such an obvious request from the Court, Defendants are barred from filing either of the two motions for special findings discussed in this memorandum.

NO FACTUAL BASIS FOR FINDINGS

6. The venomous and contentious claims by the Defendants of what the record does not show are consistently immaterial, redundant, impertinent and scandalous. Since there was no trial, there was no face-to-face testimony before the Court resulting in findings of fact. And the pleadings and supporting papers in this case show that Plaintiff has had a solid case against the Defendants based on the F.A.C.E. statute and related decisions, including those of the Middle District of Florida, until the last-minute abandonment by the Court of the Florida "procurement" test whereby police-wrongdoing becomes the responsibility of Defendants.

WHEREFORE, the relief sought by Defendants should once again be denied, which relief includes by implication a reversal of the Endorsed Order of this Court of April 15, 1999.

Respectfully submitted,
Christopher F. Sapp (signed)
Post Office Box 1012
Lehigh Acres, Florida 33970
(941) 368-3922
Florida Bar Number 0097823
Attorney for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to Roy Lucas, Esquire, Post Office Box 1433, Melbourne, Florida 32902, Susan England, Esquire, 2805 Lakeview Drive, Fern Park, Florida 32730 and to Lawrence M. Siff, Esquire, O'Connor & Meyers, PA, 2801 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9^th Floor, (Coral Gables) Miami, Florida 33134 this 6^th day of September, 1999.

Christopher F. Sapp (signed)
Attorney