PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

ABORTION INDUSTRY IN MELBOURNE, FLORIDA
LAWSUITS
RANEY V AWARE WOMAN
DOCKET / CHRONOLOGICAL FILE
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CASE NO.: 97-1197-CIV-ORL-19B

MEREDITH T. RANEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
AWARE WOMAN CENTER FOR CHOICE, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
EDWARD W. WINDLE, JR.,
and PATRICIA B. WINDLE,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Meredith T. Raney, Jr., Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned attorney, hereby responds to Defendants' motion for attorney's fees, saying:

LOCAL RULE 3.01(g)

1. Local Rule 3.01(g) requires that an attorney for a party must first confer or attempt to confer with opposing counsel before filing a motion for relief, with the exception of several specified motions of which this is not one. Before the undersigned attorney prepared this response, he telephoned Michael Hirsh to ask if there had been any telephone conversation with opposing counsel Lucas concerning the latter's motion for attorney's fees. Mr. Hirsh was contacted solely in an abundance of caution because Mr. Lucas had once before sought to involve Mr. Hirsh in these 3.01(g) conferences in spite of the fact that Mr. Hirsh was brought into the case at the eleventh hour to help with the trial and jury selection. Mr. Hirsh responded that not only had there been no conference between himself and Mr. Lucas but, furthermore, Mr. Hirsh was unaware that Defendants were moving for an award of attorney's fees since he had never received a copy of such motion. Thus, it would be appropriate to deny Defendants' motion for attorney's fees for these reasons.

FAILURE TO MEET THE CHRISTIANSBURG STANDARD

2. Defendants cite the case of Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 98 S.Ct. 694 (1978) as providing the standard under which attorney's fees should be granted to a prevailing defendant. By their own authority, Defendants are not entitled to any award of attorney's fees from anyone: not from the Plaintiff, and not from his attorney.

3. The United States Supreme Court in Christiansburg (supra), at page 700, specifies:

In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one's belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one's claim may appear at the onset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may change or clarify in the midst of litigation. emphasis supplied.

4. Plaintiff therefore is exonerated from any liability, as is his attorney, because his case was predicated on the doctrine of "procurement" enunciated in the case of Johnson v. Weiner, 155 Fla. 169, 19 So.2d 699 (1944) which doctrine was approved in the Middle District of Florida in the case of Gilbert v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 899 F. Supp. 597 (M.D. Fla. 1995) and remained in effect until the February 26, 1999 order in this case.

5. Thus, under the Christiansburg standard, Meredith T. Raney, Jr. and his attorney are not liable for any attorney's fees; nor are they so liable under the standard called "ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY" by the Defendants, which is nothing more than a restatement of Christiansburg.

MOTION SHOULD BE STRICKEN

6. The obvious reason for the Defendants' present motion is the unprofessional tactic called "poisoning the well". Defendants have produced a venomous pleading designed to vilify their opponents in an effort to prejudice the trial judge and all appellate judges who may be involved with this case. Because of the scandalous, impertinent, redundant, and immaterial allegations of this motion, it should be stricken from the record.

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

7. Rule 8 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. "Substantial justice" requires that the Defendants receive nothing whatsoever in the way of attorney's fees in this case:

(a) Defendants various counterclaims were frivolous and meant to harass and annoy the Plaintiff and cause him unnecessary expense and attorney's fees; these counterclaims have all been dismissed.
(b) Defendants took an unauthorized appeal which was dismissed by the Circuit Court of Appeals; said appeal was frivolous and without merit and was taken for purposes of delay.
(c) For a time Defendants utilized an attorney in this case who was not admitted to the Florida Bar nor admitted to this case.
(d) This same attorney utilized erroneous statements made under oath to file prematurely "depositions" which were improperly taken.
(e) Attorneys for the Defendants, on more than one occasion, failed to attend scheduled meetings which wasted many hours of Plaintiff's attorney's time.
(f) Attorneys for Defendants ignored the rules of procedure and misstated material facts. To reward such improper activity and wrongdoing by Defendants would work a substantial injustice.

WHEREFORE, the relief requested by the Defendants should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
Christopher F. Sapp (signed)
Post Office Box 1012
Lehigh Acres, Florida 33970
(941) 368-3922
Florida Bar Number 0097823
Attorney for the Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by U.S. Mail to Roy Lucas, Esquire, Post Office Box 1433, Melbourne, Florida 32902, Susan England, Esquire, 2805 Lakeview Drive, Fern Park, Florida 32730 and to Lawrence M. Siff, Esquire, O'Connor & Meyers, PA, 2801 Ponce de Leon Blvd., 9^th Floor, (Coral Gables) Miami, Florida 33134 this 13^th day of September, 1999.

Christopher F. Sapp (signed)
Attorney