ORDER, 5/19/00

ABORTION INDUSTRY IN MELBOURNE, FLORIDA
LAWSUITS
RANEY V MELBOURNE
DOCKET / CHRONOLOGICAL FILE
ORDER, 5/19/00

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
CASE NO. 6:99-CV-416-ORL-19B

MEREDITH T. RANEY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF MELBOURNE, FLORIDA,
Defendant.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (Doc. No. 14). The case was before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to appeal by Meredith T. Raney, Jr. ("Raney") of this Court's Order dated March 8, 2000. See (Doc. Nos. 11 & 12). On appeal, Raney contended to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that this Court referenced and considered a document which does not appear in the District Court's docket and with which Appellant was not served. (Doc. No. 14). Due to Raney's allegations, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case with the following instructions:

"[T]his matter is REMANDED on a limited basis to the Clerk of the Middle District of Florida for investigation and correction of the docket. In the event that the Clerk determines that the docket is correct, the District Court should hold an evidentiary hearing into Appellant's allegations and report its findings to this Court.

Id. The docket is accurate in all respects; thus, this Court will address Raney's allegations.

It appears that Raney's allegations are based on the following statement contained on the first page of this Court's order dated March 8, 2000 (the "Ranev Order"):

This cause comes before the Court on the following matters:

* * *

2) Plaintiff Meredith T. Raney, Jr.'s Motion to Strike Insufficient Defenses and Other Matter and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. No. 7, filed May 20, 1999); and Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 18 filed September 7, 1999).

(Doc. No. 11) (emphasis added). The reference to "Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. No. 18, filed September 7, 1999)" (hereinafter "Docket Number 18") is a clerical error,[1] No such document was submitted to the Court by Defendant,[2] and contrary to the statement in the Raney Order, no such document was considered by the Court in ruling on Defendant's motion to dismiss or Raney's motion to strike.

The reference to Document Number 18 was a clerical error which resulted from this Court's extraction of its analysis of the law from a prior order issued by the Court in Jane Roe, II v. Aware Woman Center For Choice, Inc., Case Number 6:99-CV-850-ORL-19A.[3] The Plaintiffs in Jane Roe. II and Raney, both alleged causes of action under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE"), and in both cases the defendants moved to dismiss the claims. The Court did extensive legal research and analysis regarding the scope and application of FACE and concluded in Jane Roe, II that plaintiff's claim was outside the intended scope of FACE. See Jane Roe, II at Doc. No. 29. Thus, on January 4, 2000, this Court dismissed the complaint in Jane Roe, II with leave to amend (the "Jane Roe, II Order").[4]

In Raney, this Court also found that the Plaintiff asserted a claim outside the intended scope of FACE. See (Doc. No. 11). Much of the legal research and analysis regarding the scope and application of FACE which was set forth in the Court's Jane Roe, II Order was relevant to the Raney Order. In light of this, the Court updated its research and, in order to avoid duplicative work in stating the case law and legislative history dealing with FACE, the Court used its legal analysis from the Jane Roe, II Order as a model for the Raney Order. See supra, note 1 (explaining the Court's use of prior orders as models for subsequent orders). The "cut", "paste" and "delete" functions of its word processing program were used to eliminate the portions of the Jane Roe, II Order that were specific to the issues and facts in Jane Roe, II, while retaining the legal research and analysis which were applicable to the Court's reasoning in Raney. In so doing, the Court inadvertently left in the reference to Docket Number 18 from the Jane Roe, II Order.[5]

Although Docket Number 18 from the Jane Roe, II Order was referenced in the Raney Order, The Court reiterates that the reference was inadvertent, and this Court did not consider that document, or any other document outside of the record of Raney v. City of Melbourne, 6:99-CV-416-ORL-19B, in ruling on Raney's motion to strike and Defendant's motion to dismiss.[6]

Given that the reference to Docket Number 18 in the Order was a clerical error, it appears that the issue on remand should be resolved by correcting the Raney Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). See Fed. R. Civ. 60(a) (providing that the district court may correct mistakes "arising from oversight or omission" that appear in judgments, orders or other parts of the record). However, a Rule 60(a) correction would not be appropriate if the Court "should hold an evidentiary hearing into [Raney's] allegations and report its findings." See (Doc. No. 14).

As noted above, the docket is correct. Thus, the Court will give the parties an opportunity to notify this Court whether an evidentiary hearing is required in light of the Court's explanation of its reference in the Ranev Order to Document Number 18.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court RULES that the parties shall have eleven (11) days from the date of this Order to request an evidentiary hearing. If such hearing is requested, the issues to be addressed at such hearing shall be identified. If the parties fail to respond to this order, or indicate that an evidentiary hearing is not necessary, then this order will be provided to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as this Court's findings regarding Mr, Raney's allegations.

DONE AND ORDERED at Orlando, Florida, this 19th day of May, 2000.

PATRICIA C. FAWSETT (signed)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Ali Counsel of Record
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

[1] Indeed, a review of the Raney Order reveals no other reference to Docket Number 18. See (Doc. No. 11); id. at 2, 10 & 15 (citing documents numbered 5 and 7 which were submitted to the Court and resolved in the Raney Order).

[2] The record reveals that Defendant did not respond to Raney's motion to strike. Despite the Defendant's failure to respond, this Court denied the motion due to the inadequacy of the legal arguments asserted and because this Court found no basis for granting the motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) . See (Doc. No. 11, at 2-3); (Doc. No. 7).

[3] The orders drafted by this Court are generally formatted the same way with regard to the caption, conclusion, and introductory section. Here, the error occurred in the introductory section which sets forth the documents filed in the case and considered by the Court. Due to the uniform format of the Court's Orders, the Court can save time in preparing legal analyses, such as in preparing orders on motions to dismiss involving the identical legal issues, by opening a prior order addressing such legal issue in the computer and customizing the already formatted document by changing the names of the parties, the dates, the docket identifications, and the statement of the facts. See infra, at p.4. Although this process often conserves time and judicial resources, unfortunately, as happened in this case, confusion can result if the modifications are not carefully checked and edited.

[4] The Jane Roe, II Order is also on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Jane Roe, II, at Doc. No. 30.

[5] The Jane Roe, II Order addressed a motion to strike; however, in Jane Roe, II, the motion to strike was filed by the defendant, and a response to the motion was filed on behalf of the plaintiff by her attorney Christopher F. Sapp. Mr. Sapp filed the response in Jane Roe, II on September 7, 1999 and it was docketed as Docket Number 18. See Jane Roe, II, at Doc. No. 18; id. at Doc. No. 29 (referencing the response as "Doc. No. 18, filed September 7, 1999"). The Court notes that Christopher F. Sapp is also the attorney for the plaintiff in Raney and presumably is aware of the parties' filings and the court's orders in both Jane Roe, II and Raney.

[6] In Jane Roe, II, the motion to strike was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g), while the motion to strike in the Raney case was made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Thus, even if this Court had considered the Jane Roe, II document filed by Mr. Sapp in deciding Raney, which the Court did not, the document would have had no impact on the Court's decision as it had no relevance to any issue raised in the Raney case. See Jane Roe, II, at Doc. No. 18.